Over the last few decades many countries have liberalized their financial sector, but the progress has not been homogeneous across countries. What may explain their differences in financial reform zeal? In this paper we focus on one particular channel and propose a stylized model to answer this question based on the interaction between lobbying activities and different measures of government fragmentation. We show that the observed differences in reform activity can be explained by the presence of fragmented governments, in which several small parties are vulnerable to lobbying activities. We test our hypothesis using a panel of OECD countries for 30 years and find that indeed government fragmentation hinders the pursuit of financial reforms. In addition, we focus on a specific dimension of financial regulation, shareholder protection, and find further evidence of a negative impact of government fragmentation on reform. Our results are robust to a large set of controls, including the proportionality of the electoral system, federalism, and population heterogeneity. 
Introduction
A big wave of reforms in the financial sector has characterized the last decades of the twentieth century, involving to a different extent virtually every country of the world (Abiad and Mody, 2005) . The trend has usually been associated with the presence of good political institutions which are found to be conducive to less distortionary policies and better financial outcomes.
1 However, even among countries endowed with good political institutions, the within-country variation in policies promoting financial sector development remains remarkable.
In this paper we analyze whether the different reform patterns observed in countries with "good institutions" may be partly imputed to one particular factor: government fragmentation. Building on the literature on political economy of finance that focuses on lobbying activities (Rajan and Zingales, 2003 ; Bebchuck and Neeman, 2010; Perotti and
Volpin, 2012), we attribute the differences in reforming activity to the presence of small parties in the governing coalitions, as these may internalize voters' welfare less completely and may be easier for lobbyists to capture.
Of course, even in the absence of lobbying, financial reforms may encounter resistance.
The literature identifies at least three main bottlenecks in the decision-making process associated with financial reforms. First, different stakeholders may have different perceptions or estimates of the risks and benefits associated with a given reform (Caselli and Gennaioli, 2008) . Second, financial reforms are generally associated with intertemporal 1 For example, Tressel and Detragiache (2008) show evidence that banking sector reforms led to financial deepening only in countries allowing sufficient checks and balances against political power. Klein and Olivei (2008) examine the relationship between capital account liberalization and financial depth and find a positive and significant effect among OECD countries, however they do not find such an effect outside members of the OECD. Focusing on equity markets, Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2005) show evidence that the growth effect from equity market liberalization remains important even after controlling for capital account liberalization. Interestingly, equity market liberalizations are most successful in countries with good political institutions. Kaminsky and Schmukler (2008) find that financial liberalization often leads to intensified boom-bust cycles in the short-run, especially in countries with poor institutions. More generally, Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, and Thaicharoen (2003) show that sensible policies seem to succeed in the presence of good institutions.
2 tradeoffs, or at least with a delayed enjoyment of their benefits, not rewarding reformers in the short-run (Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2008) . Third, any deviation from the status quo is inherently associated with uncertainty and potential volatility, which may reduce the political payoffs of reform (Abiad and Mody, 2005) . We decide here to abstract from these issues largely covered in the literature and rather focus on the interaction between lobbyists and semi-benevolent politicians prone to partly trade off citizens' welfare against lobbyists' financial support, following Grossman and Helpman (1994) . More specifically,
we develop a theoretical model linking the presence of small parties with veto power to the difficulty of undertaking welfare improving financial reforms.
Empirically, we test whether fragmented governments are found to be easier to capture.
We follow the political economy literature in identifying fragmentation as a key factor in determining governments' policy-making constraints (Alesina and Perotti, 1995) . More particularly, fragmentation refers to the notion that each party in a coalition government is an elementary decision-making unit, whose multiplication affects the cohesion of the government and, thereby, its ability to reach an agreement to deviate from the status quo.
We use indices of fragmentation capturing the weight of different parties in a coalition such as the Herfindahl index. The use of such indices is normally justified in the literature as the result of a war-of-attrition game, in which players differ in policy preferences and time discounting, exploiting their veto power until the proposed piece of legislation gets close enough to their optimum (Alesina and Drazen, 1991) . 2 We provide however a slightly different interpretation, based on the concept that every party of a ruling coalition can potentially be a veto player and shape its preferences on the level of financial liberalization based on a combination of idiosyncratic ideological bias and lobbying contributions (see, e.g., Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi, 2010).
We find that indeed cohesive (i.e., less fragmented) governments are characterized by a greater ability to fend off lobbying attempts and overcome resistance to enact financial reforms designed to promote financial sector development. We first analyze domestic financial reforms in a panel composed of yearly observations for 30 OECD countries from 1975 to 2005. The index of financial reforms we use is a composite index covering several aspects of financial policy borrowed from Abiad, Detragiache, and Tressel (2010) . It ranges from bank entry barriers, prudential bank regulations, securities market policy, and privatizations of banks to the relaxation of controls on credits and international financial transactions. We exploit the variation in the timing of these financial policy changes across countries by using panel fixed-effects models. Our results indicate that fragmented governments represent an obstacle to financial policy changes during the three decades studied. We report a noticeable economic effect. For example, a one standard deviation increase in the Herfindahl index for government leads to an increase in financial liberalization equivalent to the full liberalization of one dimension of the index of financial reforms in slightly less than six years. In estimating this effect, we include country and year fixed effects and control for a series of time-varying determinants of financial policy changes.
We test the robustness of our results in several ways. We first test whether they are not driven by characteristics of countries' constitutional design and population, for which our indices of government fragmentation might be merely proxying. To assuage the latter concern, we examine the impact of the proportionality of the electoral system, the federal structure, and the underlying group structure of ethnicities, languages, and religions, which is shown not to affect our results. Second, using an instrumental variables (IV) technique, we find that our results are robust to reverse causality. Third,
we obtain similar results if we use ordered logit estimations, if we employ alternative proxies capturing the effect of the smallest government party, if we further control for balance-of-payments and banking crises, and if we run "horse races" between our indices of government fragmentation and other dimensions of political fragmentation.
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As an external validation of the model, we also extend our empirical analysis to a key element of financial policy: shareholder protection. Indeed, a great deal of theory and evidence supports the idea that insufficient reforms aimed at protecting the rights of outside investors, including shareholders, can be costly for an economy's performance, as summarized by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2000) and Beck and Levine (2005) . Since such reforms imply loss of rents for corporate insiders, (captured) governments may have little incentive to enact reforms to bring a country with poor shareholder protection up to the best practices. We therefore ask ourselves whether fragmented governments may be associated with poorer shareholder protection. We employ the adjusted "anti-director rights" index constructed by Pagano and Volpin (2005) to the period 1993-2002. While the proportionality of the electoral system remains a strong determinant, we find that government fragmentation also appears to be associated with weak shareholder protection. It may be hard to disentangle the respective effects of the proportionality of the electoral system and government fragmentation. However, by restricting our sample to OECD countries with proportional electoral system, we find that government fragmentation is still significantly and negatively correlated with shareholder protection.
Related Literature. This paper is related to several strands of literature. First, our work complements existing research on the political economy of finance that focuses on lobbying. In their seminal work, Rajan and Zingales (2003) argue that the level of financial development (a proxy for financial reform) results from the political influence of incumbent firms which try to shield their rents from competition by outsiders. Finally, this paper also builds on the empirical literature linking political fragmentation and fiscal distress, which has been extensively tested since the seminal work by Roubini and Sachs (1989) . Works by Alesina, Perotti, and Tavares (1998), Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002) , Woo (2003) , Ricciuti (2004) , and many others show that higher political fragmentation leads to higher public deficits or public debt.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a stylized model of lobbying and financial reform and Section 3 derives testable predictions. Section 4 describes the data and empirical methodology. Section 5 shows our empirical results and discusses robustness issues. Section 6 provides corroborating evidence on shareholder protection. Section 7 concludes.
A Simple Model of Lobbying
This section presents a simple model to show why politicians may be interested in the level of financial liberalization of their country and how they can determine it endogenously in a framework à la Tsebelis (2011) , in which each party of a ruling coalition acts as a veto player.
Consider a simple two-factor open economy described by the following constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas production function:
where financial capital F and labor W are combined to produce a unit of output Y with an exogenously given level of productivity, A. The parameter γ ∈ [0; 1] represents the technology of production (i.e., the relative importance of capital and labor in the production process). Financial capital is assumed to be composed of an endogenously determined share (δ) of the exogenously given total world savings (S), so that F = δS. Savers have one unit of capital and if they want to invest it in the country they are also assumed to settle there. For simplicity, we assume that returns on capital invested in the rest of the world are lower than in the economy considered, but the amount of capital flowing into the country is constrained by domestic policy decisions. In particular, the share of world savings invested in the economy of the country depends on the investment opportunities opened up through financial reforms undertaken by semi-benevolent politicians à la Grossman and Helpman (1994) who give the same weight to workers' and savers' welfare.
Parties' preferences are expressed in terms of a stylized political economy model. We assume that incumbent political parties, alone or as part of a ruling coalition, are assigned the only task of choosing δ, their desired level of financial liberalization in the economy.
In the spirit of Grossman and Helpman (1994), parties define their optimal level of reform based on two factors: the total amount of funds received from financial sector lobbying activities (L) and the citizens' welfare. 5 The latter is captured by wages (w) and returns on the financial capital invested (r), as shown in the following objective function:
In this expression, each incumbent political party (i) trades off the financial support obtained from lobbying activities (L) against citizens' labor remuneration (w) and financial capital returns (r). For simplicity, the same weight is given to the remuneration of the two factors, which amounts to considering the economy as evenly split between financial capital holders and labor providers, with every inflow of capital being matched with a corresponding inflow of labor. 6 The relative weight given by each party to citizens' welfare and lobbying is captured by a country-specific componentβ c common to all the parties in the country and a party-specific component β i , which can be seen as proxying a particular party's relative benevolence. In empirical terms, though, we cannot observe benevolence, so we need to make some operational assumptions. In particular, we assume that voters can to a certain extent screen parties' benevolence in such a way that the size of party i can be considered as a proxy for β i , that is, larger parties are more benevolent and thus put more weight on voters' welfare whereas smaller parties are more prone to accept lobbying contributions.
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In particular, lobbying money obtained by each party in a coalition government is assumed to be a share (l) of all the profits obtained in the financial sector, L = lΠ, whereas total profits can be expressed as the returns (π) on the financial capital invested (F ), that is, Π = πF . Assuming no heterogeneity across providers of the same factor and competitive markets, the holders of financial capital are remunerated according to the marginal productivity of their factor, π =
∂Y ∂F
, so that the amount of lobbying money (L) available for any incumbent party is equal to
As for the welfare of citizens, in our stylized model it depends on the remuneration of both factors of production, to which the incumbent politician gives the same weight.
Abstracting from any heterogeneity of workers, each unit of labor will receive the same remuneration (w) equal to
The same holds for the remuneration of financial capital, r, with the only difference that part of it is used for lobbying activities and does not accrue to its holders, whose remuneration can then be written as
Recall that even though the international amount of savings (S) is exogenously given in 
Notice that when there is no lobbying (l = 0) or no importance is given to lobbying money (β i = 1), the level of liberalization δ follows the evolution of local labor force and world savings, which the parties take as exogenous, Turning to the political economy setting of the model, we consider parties as locked in stable coalitions. We abstract from the process of coalition formation (as, for example, outlined in Baron and Hirsch, 2012) and rather focus on the behavior of incumbent parties maximizing equation (2) . This choice is justified by two facts. First, in our dataset we only observe governing coalitions of parties, but we do not observe the political dynamics that led to that outcome. Second, it can be argued that coalitions are built on political platforms involving more dimensions than simply financial reform. However, we want to focus on this particular issue, so we take the rest as given and just focus on the preferences, in terms of financial liberalization, of incumbent parties.
Testable Predictions of the Model
In this section, we derive predictions from our theoretical results which will be empirically investigated in Section 5.
The empirical strategy followed to test the above model relies on the consideration that, when coalitions are needed to obtain a majority in the parliament, each party of the coalition is in fact a veto player (Tsebelis, 2011) . Lobbyists are thus able to target just one party to block reform. Given that parties are here assumed to be heterogeneous only along two dimensions (benevolence, β i , and bias vis-à-vis financial liberalization, ξ i ), we predict that the speed and extent of financial reform will be driven by the parties at the extreme of the size distribution in a ruling coalition.
Specifically, assuming that benevolence is somehow perceived by voters and associated with party size, larger parties (high β i ) are expected to act as a downward boundary to financial liberalization and the smaller parties (low β i ) as an upward boundary because the latter will ceteris paribus prefer lower degrees of financial liberalization. In other words, a country will become more (less) financially liberalized only when the change is compatible with the preferences of the smallest (largest) party in the ruling coalition.
Therefore, the number of parties in the coalition does not affect the amount of lobbying resources available for each party because lobbyists only need to target one veto player at the extreme of the size distribution. However, given that each party has also an idiosyncratic preference for financial liberalization, we cannot focus only on the smallest party of a coalition, but we must look at the overall configuration of the coalition to account for the possibility of having more than one small party. To this end, we turn to a commonly used index of fragmentation, the Herfindahl index, which provides information on the relative importance of small parties in the coalition, after having controlled for the share of the largest party.
The primary focus on the smallest parties (and thus on the upward boundary to financial reform) is motivated by the empirical observation that in our panel all the countries experience a constant increase in the labor force and a consistent process of incremental financial liberalization (see Section 4). Thus, we expect the speed of adoption of reforms in the financial sector to be affected primarily by the presence of small parties, which are the ones most likely to determine the upward boundary of the level of financial liberalization (unless other members of the coalition have a strong anti-liberalization bias).
In other words, even if the labor force increases constantly and would call for a constant gradual increase of liberalization, after every election the level of β i of each party is expected to change and the overall preferences of the ruling coalition will be determined by the "veto power" of the parties less willing to liberalize: the ones with the lowest combination of party-size-related β i and random ξ i .
Also, it must be noted that we have no prior on the relative importance of the idiosyncratic component of party preferences (ξ) over the benevolence component captured by party size (β). If the importance of the former is such as to make the latter insignificant, then it would suffice to count the number of parties in a coalition to infer the probability of having at least one veto player and we would not need to turn to a metrics of fragmentation to capture the relative size of all the parties. To allow for this possibility, we test the validity of the model (6) using not only an index of fragmentation, but also an index capturing purely the number of parties.
Data and Empirical Methodology
This section introduces the set of variables and the empirical methodology. Also, since we focus on the type and structure of governments to explain differences in financial reforms across time and space, we need to restrict our sample to countries endowed with stable and high-quality democratic institutions. 10 To identify countries endowed with democratic institutions in the years considered, we employ the Polity 2 index, which sums a democracy score (ranging from 0 to 10) for each country with an autocracy score (ranging from 0 to -10).
11 Our threshold value for Polity 2 is 5 out of 10, which is a reasonable boundary for a stable democracy in the Polity IV dataset. Table 1 reports the definition of the variables and their sources, while Tables 2 and 3 contain descriptive statistics. This index encompasses a broad range of financial liberalizations occurring during thirty years. It has also the advantage of putting more weight on reforms in the domestic financial sector rather than on liberalization of capital flows, which are often negotiated and decided at a supranational level. This is an ideal feature for our purposes because we are more interested in domestic political dynamics than in global trends. Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics. We note that the mean value of the normalized index, FR, is 0.707, meaning that OECD countries display fairly liberalized financial sectors. Also, we can clearly see that the index of financial reform varies substantially through much of the sample, with a standard deviation equal to 0.253. In line with previous studies, the average value of 0.020 for the first differences of the index of finan-cial reforms, ∆FR, suggests that liberalizations advanced through much of the OECD countries over the sample period.
Definition of Variables and Descriptive Statistics

Index of Financial
Indices of Government Fragmentation. In order to capture the fragmentation of power within a governing coalition, we use proxies borrowed from the World Bank Database of Political Institutions (WBDPI). 13 Specifically, following the political economy literature, we focus on the number and size of parties in a coalition government and use two indicators of fragmentation: the Herfindahl index and the number of parties. As for the first, the Herfindahl index for government (denoted HERFGOV) is the sum of the squares of the seats' share of all parties in the government. Formally,
where s ijt is the share of seats of party i in the coalition government j in year t. Shares are computed based on the total number of seats in the parliament held by the government.
The index ranges from 0 to 1 and can be thought of as a measure of fragmentation of power in the ruling coalition, many smaller parties being associated with lower values than fewer bigger parties. Our second indicator is the number of parties in the ruling coalition. This variable, labeled NUMBER OF PARTIES, is a simple count of the political parties present in the government. As discussed in Section 3, both indicators provide two alternative ways of capturing the relevant role that can be played by veto players in a government to block financial reform.
Our indices of government fragmentation vary more than we initially expected (see Table 2 ). The average value of HERFGOV is 0.712, meaning that countries have on average few big parties in their governing coalitions, especially considering that different electoral systems and population heterogeneity are included in this average. NUMBER OF PARTIES follows a similar pattern as HERFGOV.
13 See Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer, and Walsh (2001) for further information. In Table 3 , we show that the high mean value for HERFGOV in Table 2 is not purely driven by single-party governments (for which HERFGOV equals 1), but the Herfindahl index can be also high for coalition governments. Of course, the mean value of our indices of government fragmentation increases as the number parties in the government increases.
However, Table 3 shows how the fragmentation of power within coalition government is still highly present in two-party governments (the median number for HERFGOV is 0.677 and the maximum is 0.987) and that the fragmentation of power increases smoothly as the number of parties increases. Multi-party governments represent more than 60% of our sample, whose 35% are composed by four parties or more. Additional information is provided on Panel B of Table 3 , which indicates the correlations between our indices of government fragmentation.
In addition, we introduce the share of seats held by the largest government party (LARGEST SEAT SHARE, see Tables 2 and 3 for descriptive statistics). This ensures that the variability of the Herfindahl index is not completely driven by changes in the size of the largest party alone (which is the main component of the Herfindahl index). This also controls for the fact that the index may in principle not increase monotonically in the number of very small parties.
14 Control Variables. We use standard control variables present in the literature. In particular, we control for macroeconomic and institutional environment as well as for shocks and learning process altering the pace at which reforms occur.
The decision to deepen financial liberalization via further reform may be influenced by the informative content of previous financial reforms, in terms of costs and benefits. We capture this informative content by lagging the index of financial reform (FR) and its first difference, that is, controlling for past levels of financial liberalization and for previous financial reforms.
As the demand for financial services increases with the level of economic development, we include the first lag of the variable GDP PER CAPITA. We then account for differences in the macroeconomic environment by the following variables: RECESSION, INFLATION, and GFCF. Movements in these variables capture the size of internal and external macroeconomic shocks experienced by a country. The dummy variable RECES-SION is defined as a year where annual real GDP growth is negative. INFLATION is defined as the annual rate of inflation. GFCF is the gross fixed capital formation as a share of GDP. We also control for the role played by trade openness in fostering financial reforms as argued by Rajan and Zingales (2003) . 15 The variable TRADE OPENNESS is computed as total international trade (imports plus exports) as a share of GDP.
In some cases, OECD countries embrace reforms in their financial system due to their membership to supranational organizations such as the European Union. EU MEMBER-SHIP is a zero-one indicator whose value is one since the year of entry to the European Union.
Political Economy Control Variables. To control for the impact of other political economy factors, we use IDEOLOGY, FIRST YEAR, HERFOPP, and MAJORITY GOVERNMENT. A push for financial reforms may stem from the ideological bias of the parties in the government. IDEOLOGY is an index of government orientation with respect to economic policy ranging from 0 to 3 and is coded to have lower value associated with right-wing governments and higher value with left-wing governments. Then, FIRST YEAR is a dummy variable indicating the executive's first year in office. This is a control for the "honeymoon hypothesis", suggesting that new governments have incentives to pass 15 Rajan and Zingales (2003) argue, more precisely, that it is the combination of trade openness and financial openness that makes incumbents more willing to reform the financial sector. However, we find that the inclusion of financial openness has no additional explanatory power and does not affect our results. In unreported results, we employ the US interest rate to capture financial openness as in Abiad and Mody (2005) . Since this variable is country-invariant, it is by and large captured by our year effects.
reforms at early stage of their mandate in order to realize the benefits of reform before the next election. We also consider the opposition fragmentation, as in principle it can play a role in preventing the government from altering the status quo. This is motivated by the fact that a few bigger opposition parties may find it easier to coordinate against government proposals, whereas a fragmented opposition may have divergent interests and its cohesion may break down on specific government initiatives. Thus, the Herfindahl index The last part of Table 1 also considers control variables that will be presented and discussed in Section 5.2.
Empirical Methodology
We are interested in examining the effect of government fragmentation on financial reforms. As a first step, we check the stationarity of ∆FR. To this end, we implement the Fisher-type Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) panel unit root tests proposed by Maddala and Wu (1999) . Unreported test results conclude that ∆FR is integrated of order zero (I(0)), which means that we should not incur in spurious results.
We then estimate the following dynamic model, where the dependent variable (in first differences and levels) is lagged:
In model (8) 
Empirical Results
This section presents the empirical results and robustness checks. In particular, Section 5.1 shows our main results. Section 5.2 further explores whether deeper country-specific factors drive our results, while Section 5.3 discusses the possibility of reverse causality.
Section 5.4 ends up with additional robustness checks. 16 The presence of the lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side implies that the fixed effects estimator is biased, albeit the bias is likely to disappear for a fixed number of countries as the number of time periods increases. In practice, however, Judson and Owen (1999) have shown that the bias is negligible for panels that cover more than 20 years. We have an average number of year per country equal to 24. Table 4 contains our main results. Columns (1) to (4) show the results for HERFGOV, while columns (5) and (6) show the results for NUMBER OF PARTIES. Each column estimates the corresponding effect with a different set of control variables. As the results are robust across specifications, we first discuss the impact of these indices of government fragmentation, our variables of interest, and then turn to the discussion of the control variables. Table 4 provides strong evidence in support of the prediction that less fragmented governments have a positive and significant effect on the pace of financial reform. The effect is statistically and economically significant. In almost all specifications the coefficient on HERFGOV is positive and significantly different from zero at the 1% level, the only exception being column (3) in which it is significantly different from zero at the 5% level.
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Main Results
The coefficients on HERFGOV range from 0.022 to 0.091. Column (4), which includes the full set of controls, is the preferred specification. A one standard deviation increase of HERFGOV implies a 0.025 increase in the change of the index of financial reforms (i.e., 0.272*0.091), which is a sizable effect considering that the index ranges between 0 and 1.
The latter effect is equivalent to move from no liberalization to full liberalization in one of the seven dimensions of FR in slightly less than six years. Taking the remaining specifications, a one standard deviation increase in HERFGOV leads to an increase in ∆FR of 0.006 points, in column (3), to 0.024 points, in column (2) . Notice that in columns (2) and (4), where the control variable LARGEST SEAT SHARE is introduced, the coefficient on HERFGOV becomes stronger. This means that keeping the share of the largest party in the coalition constant, the marginal effect of fragmentation is even stronger. But it should be noticed that the inverse is also true. Since the coefficient on LARGEST SEAT SHARE is negative and significant, an increase in the size of the largest party, holding the overall Herfindahl index fixed, would imply a higher degree of government fragmentation (i.e., a higher number of small parties) and thus hinder reforms.
As explained in Section 3, we have to examine not only the effect of the relative size of all government parties, but also the effect of the number of government parties.
Columns (5) and (6) accordingly show that the number of parties present in the governments negatively impacts financial policy change. Although, the results for NUMBER OF PARTIES are somewhat weaker, the coefficient remains significantly different from zero at conventional levels. The coefficients on NUMBER OF PARTIES are equal to -0.003.
The economic impact of NUMBER OF PARTIES is largely relevant. Let us consider the effect of adding one party to the government. We focus on such unit increase in NUMBER OF PARTIES because it relates to some concrete feature of the political equilibrium and it is quite close to the standard deviation of NUMBER OF PARTIES (1.449). Adding one party to the government (using the coefficient of column (6)) maps into a decrease of 0.003 points in the pace of financial reforms (∆FR). This result suggests that the bias towards the status quo increases with the number of parties in the ruling coalition.
We now turn to a discussion of the results of the control variables included in Table   4 . Past financial reforms (measured by the lagged dependent variable, ∆F R c,t−1 ) enter the regressions positively but just fail to be significantly different from zero at the 10% level. The lagged level of financial liberalization, F R c,t−1 , exerts a large, negative, and strongly significant effect on actual financial policy change. This suggests that countries with highly repressed financial sector have more potential to embrace reforms, whereas in countries with highly liberalized financial sector there is less space for further reforms.
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The lagged level of economic development does not seem to have an influence on financial reforms. The effect of the recession dummy variable is positive and significant, stressing that recessions give impetus to reform. INFLATION is negative and significantly different from zero at the 1% level in all specifications. GFCF has also some explanatory power. Last, in columns (3), (4), and (6), we examine respectively the effects of government's ideological orientation, government's first year in office, opposition fragmentation, and majority government. None of these variables appear statistically significant, with the exception of IDEOLOGY in column (6) only. The coefficient on IDEOLOGY is positive, small, and significant, meaning that left-wing governments tend to reform more the financial sector than their centrist and rightist counterparts.
In sum, the findings in Table 4 are consistent with the theoretical model, indicating that fragmented governments underprovide financial reforms and are more easily captured by lobbyists. While our indices of government fragmentation perform well in regressions, an important concern is whether government fragmentation is simply a proxy for other characteristics of a country's constitutional arrangements and population. We address this concern in the next section.
Proportional Electoral System, Federalism, and Population
Heterogeneity
In this section, we examine whether the effect of government fragmentation identified is not driven by deeper country-specific factors. We further explore the role played by proportional electoral system, federalism, and ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization. Table 5 shows the results and only reports, for brevity, the variables of interest.
The political science literature has long stressed the implications for governments of the proportionality of the electoral system (see, e.g., Lijphart, 1994) . Indeed, proportional electoral systems are much more likely to produce multi-party governments, whereas To address both issues we add PROPORTIONALITY in our base specifications. The indicator of the degree of proportionality of the electoral system is constructed as in Pagano and Volpin (2005) . It ranges between 0 and 3 and is coded to have lower value associated with pure majoritarianism and higher value with pure proportionality (definition and source are reported in Table 1 ). The variable PROPORTIONALITY enters significantly and negatively in columns (1) and (2), suggesting that proportional electoral systems are less prone to pursuing reforms in the financial sector than majoritarian systems, consistently with the findings of Pagano and Volpin (2005) . More importantly, the results for our indices of government fragmentation are unaffected.
A country's federal structure may also favor government fragmentation and affect policy outcome. We therefore include a dummy variable for federal structures (called FEDERAL) in columns (3) and (4) . From these specifications, federalism does not appear to be a significant determinant of financial reforms, whereas government fragmentation remains a significant one.
An important body of empirical research also supports the claim that the degree of heterogeneity within a country's population affects governments and policy outcomes.
Columns (5) and (6) control for the underlying group structure of ethnicities, languages, and religions in OECD countries. We rely on the (time-invariant) fractionalization variables computed by Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, and Wacziarg (2003), which reflect the probability that two randomly selected individuals from a population belong, respectively, to different ethnicities, languages, and religions (see Table 1 for definitions).
From columns (5) and (6), none of the fractionalization variables appear significantly different from zero, with the only exception of RELIGION. Again, both statistical and economic significance of our indices of government fragmentation are unaffected.
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Overall, these results confirm that government fragmentation plays a significant and distinct role on financial policy change and does not capture other deep features of a country's political institutions and population.
Reverse Causality
While the panel techniques account for time-invariant country characteristics and time trends, the results may still be driven by reverse causality. In theory, cases could be imagined in which the need for financial reforms in a country changes its institutions so deeply as to affect government fragmentation through the voting behavior of citizens.
Although the generality of this claim is disputable, it is a possibility that we want to rule out by properly instrumenting variation in government fragmentation.
In order to address concerns about reverse causality, we use an IV technique, and specifically two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimations. We identify instruments that provide additional variability to the country and year fixed effects. We instrument the Herfindahl of the ruling coalition and the number of parties in a coalition using two variables which are not related to structural characteristics -such as the constitutional design or population characteristics which may affect financial reforms as well -but rather to the occasional electoral outcomes which always involve a component of randomness.
The first instrument is called POLITICAL COMPETITION and is defined as the difference between the Herfindahl index for government and the Herfindahl index for opposition. This instrument captures the relative strength of the ruling coalition vis-à-vis the remaining parties in the parliament. We argue that the degree of political competition affects the composition of the government. In other words, holding everything else fixed, a high value of this instrument (i.e., low political competition) would be associated with having one very large party leading the government coalition or having a government coalition of few large parties. This would then result in a high level of Herfindahl index and in a lower level of parties needed in the coalition.
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The second instrument is called CLOSE ELECTIONS and is a dummy set to one if the coalition has just slightly more than half of the seats in the parliament. In particular, we consider the first quartile of the sample distribution of the difference between the coalition seat share and the 50% threshold. This variable captures the possibility that a party receives a big share of the vote but falls short of reaching the 50% and the needs to find smaller parties to get majority in the parliament. This combination of a very large and one or a few very small parties would result in a high Herfindahl index and, possibly, a lower number of parties in the ruling coalition. Table 6 displays 2SLS results. Columns (1) and (3) are the first-stage regressions, in which HERFGOV and NUMBER OF PARTIES are respectively regressed on the two instruments and the set of control variables and fixed effects. Columns (2) and (4) Given the validity of our instruments, 20 we further check the endogeneity of our indices of government fragmentation by performing Durbin-Wu-Hausman test. We fail to reject the null hypothesis that the specified endogenous regressors (i.e., our indices of government fragmentation) can actually be treated as exogenous. Thus, we can be confident that our estimations in previous sections do not lead to inconsistent and biased estimates.
Miscellaneous Robustness Checks
This section presents additional robustness checks. For brevity, the results are either untabulated or reported in Appendix. All of the results discussed below are available upon request. 20 Our instruments are significantly different from zero at conventional levels in first-stage regressions. The first-stage F -statistics, reported at the bottom of Table 6 , are above the 19.93 value required for a 2SLS estimation with two instruments, meaning that our instruments are strong and thus satisfy the relevance condition (Stock and Yogo, 2005) . Moreover, the Hansen J-statistics as well as the difference-inSargan statistics suggest that our instruments are not correlated with ǫ c,t , the error term of the structural equation (8), and thus satisfy the exogeneity condition.
Ordered Logit Estimations. Our main results rely on standard fixed-effects methods
instead of probability models because the updated index compiled by Abiad, Detragiache, and Tressel (2010) is more continuous than the one compiled by Abiad and Mody (2005) . 21 However, to be fully consistent with Abiad and Mody (2005) and allow comparability, we also report the results using ordered logit method for our estimation. The results are presented in Table A2 .
The results do not change our conclusions and confirm our prediction that the status quo bias decreases as governments become less fragmented. The interpretation of the coefficients become somewhat different. We calculate the marginal effects of the righthand side variables on the probabilities of undertaking financial reforms. From column (1), the marginal effect on probabilities shows that HERFGOV increases the likelihood of financial reform by 6.5%, while, from column (2), NUMBER OF PARTIES increases it by 3%. The marginal effects of the remaining right-hand side variables are consistent with our prior findings.
Alternative Proxies for the Smallest Government Party. We also repeat our regression results using a somehow less precise but more immediately evident proxy for the smallest party in a coalition government, namely a dummy variable set to one if at least one government party holds less than 20% of the government seat shares. The results are remarkably in line to the ones obtained in Section 5.1 and confirm our prediction that small parties, at the extreme of the size distribution in a coalition, are the drivers of the reform agenda. For a specification similar to column (1) of Table 4 , the dummy variable for governments with a party holding less than 20% of the seats has a coefficient of -0.009 (p-value of 0.048). Since the threshold of 20% is arbitrarily chosen, we perform sensitivity analyses using different thresholds and we obtain qualitatively similar results.
Balance-of-Payments and Banking Crises. In their study, Abiad and Mody (2005) highlight that different types of crises trigger different actions on financial sector policy.
The authors show that balance-of-payments crises raise the likelihood of reform, whereas banking crises have the opposite effect. We therefore further control for both balance-ofpayments and banking crises. Closely following the aforementioned study, we include two dummy variables, respectively, for balance-of-payments and banking crises based on data use, however, we obtain results that are similar to those in Table 4 . HERFGOV is always positive and significant, with a coefficient of 0.039 (p-value of 0.002) if we take a specification similar to column (1) of Table 4 . Similarly, NUMBER OF PARTIES shows a negative coefficient (value of -0.004) and significantly different from zero (p-value of 0.086).
Other Dimensions of Political Fragmentation. Although we have considered so far various political economy variables, one may wonder whether our conclusions are altered by other dimensions of political fragmentation, namely fragmentation among institutions and fragmentation over time. In this respect, we discuss in turn two sets of tests. 22 First, we test whether our results still hold when the parties in the government do not enjoy an absolute majority in the chambers that have lawmaking powers. Indeed, if the opposition has the majority in one of the chambers, the government has to engage in negotiations to pass reforms or amend them to obtain the favor of some opposition party. This may result in a lower ability to enact needed reforms. The variable ALLHOUSE is defined as being a dummy variable taking the value of one when the party of the executive has the absolute majority of both chambers. When we include this measure of fragmentation among chambers, as a control in our base specifications, our results are similar to those in Table 4 .
We also include a measure of checks and balances among institutions. In fact, our indices of government fragmentation do not capture the effectiveness of electoral checks on government decision makers and the electoral rules that influence party control over members. When the system of checks and balances among different constitutional players is weak, government control of the legislative apparatus is usually strong. Therefore, we employ the variable CHECKS, which takes into account the number of players with a veto in a political system, adjusted for whether they are independent of each other, their respective party affiliation, and the electoral rules. 23 The inclusion of CHECKS in our base specifications does not affect our results, neither in significance nor in sign or order of magnitude.
Similarly, in proportional electoral systems we need to distinguish between those characterized by closed lists and those which are not. In the former case, the choice of the candidates is centralized, with the identities of the elected depending on the votes received by their party and by the position occupied in the lists. Members of parliaments elected in this way have to please the chief executives of their parties to be candidate in the next election, and therefore are expected to stick to their will. In contrast, when voters can choose between candidates in the same list, a centrifugal force is expected to emerge.
Each candidate may try to obtain support of specific groups at the expense of the member of the same list and offer her support to financial reforms desired by those groups. Open lists strengthen fragmentation coming from proportional representation. CLOSED LISTS is a dummy variable set to one when there are closed lists and zero otherwise. Our results are unaffected by the inclusion of CLOSED LISTS in our base specifications when the sample is restricted to countries with proportional electoral system.
Second, government entrenchment may frustrate any attempt to alter the status quo.
We use two measures capturing temporal aspects of fragmentation. We employ the vari- 
Shareholder Protection
The previous section shows that government fragmentation results in a decrease in reforms aimed at supporting financial sector development. We find support for our theoretical prediction that the presence of many small parties in the ruling coalition makes governments more prone to be influenced by lobbyists' financial support and, thereby, oppose financial reforms. In this section, as an external validation of our hypothesis, we Second, we examine the effect of government fragmentation on the level of shareholder protection in OECD countries.
25 24 For details on the construction of the index, see www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/sept05_data_pagano. zip. 25 For consistency, we use the same set of control variables (with the exception of the lagged the dependent variable) and the same estimation method as before. In untabulated results, we closely follow the specification of Pagano and Volpin (2005) and we obtain remarkably similar results than what Table  7 depicts.
31
We report results in Panels A and B of Table 7 . In column (1), we first regress shareholder protection on government fragmentation and the same set of control variables as before. We find that our indices of government fragmentation have the expected sign and they are significantly different from zero at the 5% level. We then introduce (in column (2)) the variable measuring the proportionality of the electoral system. Our indices of government fragmentation turn insignificant, while the proportional electoral systems' indicator is negatively and significantly different from zero at the 1% level. However, the proportionality of the electoral system and government fragmentation are highly correlated and it is therefore difficult to disentangle their respective effects. To circumvent this concern and make more sense of our regression outputs, we limit our sample to various degree of proportionality, namely when PROPORTIONALITY is bigger or equal to 1 and to 2. Columns (3) and (4) show that for each degree of proportionality our indices of government fragmentation are positively and significantly different from zero at conventional levels, confirming our prediction. To be sure that these results are not driven by both extremes of the distribution, we also restrict the sample within each degree of proportionality, i.e., when PROPORTIONALITY equals 1, 2, and 3. The remaining columns also support that government fragmentation affects negatively and significantly shareholder protection in OECD countries.
All in all, we show a negative relationship between government fragmentation and shareholder protection and provide additional supporting evidence for our prediction.
Notably, these findings confirm that the level of shareholder protection at any given point in time results partly from recent decisions made by governments (and indirectly by lobbying activities), and partly by long-standing factors such as the electoral system.
Conclusion
In this paper we have shown how government fragmentation can hinder financial reforms even when they would result in clear welfare improvements for the society. Theo-retically, this outcome is justified as the result of a stylized political economy setting in which lobbying contributions can be used to convince small veto players in a coalition government to block reform. Confronting policy makers with a simple financial policy choice in a stylized macroeconomic model, we show that semi-benevolent politicians may favor the interests of an organized group of citizens over the general public when lobbying is involved. Linking incumbent parties' size to the internalization of general welfare, we show that smaller parties may resist lobbying from the financial sector only if they have a strong ideological bias towards financial liberalization, as also observed by Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi (2010). Thus, the higher the number of small parties in a coalition, the higher the probability that one of them will be a potential veto player for reform.
Empirically, we test indirectly our hypothesis using different controls, proxies for government fragmentation, and empirical methodologies. Our results consistently point in the direction of a significantly negative impact of government fragmentation on financial reforms. Furthermore, we provide a form of external validation of our hypothesis by focusing on shareholder protection policies and show that they are negatively affected by the fragmentation of the ruling coalition. Therefore, we claim that notwithstanding the likely time-invariant legislative structure of the country in which lobbyists operate (Bennedsen and Feldmann, 2002) , the time-varying size distribution of parties within a legislature matters in determining the success of lobbying efforts. Table 3 Descriptive
Statistics of Indices of Government Fragmentation
This table presents data on government fragmentation. Panel A reports the descriptive statistics for each index of government fragmentation, which are computed using restrictions based on the number of parties present in the government. Panel B reports correlation coefficients across indices of government fragmentation, which are computed using full-sample pooled data. Table A1 . Table 1 summarizes variables definitions and sources. All specifications are estimated with robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by country. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) Table A1 . Table 1 summarizes variables definitions and sources. All specifications are estimated with robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by country. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) Table 6 2SLS Estimations
This table reports 2SLS regressions of financial policy change to government fragmentation. In the first-stage (columns (1) and (3)), the dependent variable is HERFGOV and NUMBER OF PARTIES, respectively. In the second-stage (columns (2) and (4)), the dependent variable is ∆FR. The instruments for both indices of government fragmentation are POLITICAL COMPETITION and CLOSE ELECTIONS. POLITICAL COMPETITION is defined as the difference between the Herfindahl indices for the government and the opposition (drawn from WBDPI database). CLOSE ELECTIONS is a dummy set to one if the difference between the total seats share in the parliament held by government parties and the 50% threshold is within the first quartile of the sample distribution (drawn from WBDPI database and authors' own calculations). All specifications control for lagged financial reforms (in first differences and levels), economic development, recession, inflation, gross fixed capital formation, trade openness, EU membership, and year and country fixed effects. This Table 7 Shareholder Protection
This table reports results relating shareholder protection to government fragmentation. The dependent variable is an indicator of shareholder protection, which is the "anti-director rights" index as updated by Pagano and Volpin (2005) . In Panel A, the independent variable of interest is HERFGOV, while in Panel B the independent variable of interest is NUMBER OF PARTIES.
Each column limits the number of countries based on various degree of proportionality of the electoral system. Depending on the specifications, the regressions control for proportional electoral system, economic development, recession, inflation, gross fixed capital formation, trade openness, EU membership, year and country fixed effects. This table only reports the coefficients of variables of interest for clarity. The panel spans the 1993-2002 interval and includes OECD countries. Table 1 summarizes variables definitions and sources. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) 
